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Quality of Life 
Rev. John R. Connery, S.J. 
Father Connery , a member of Linacre Quarterly's editorial advisory 
board, is professor emeritus of theology at Loyola University of Chicago. 
He is afrequent contributor to Linacre. 
In recent years, due to advances in medical sciences , the capability of 
prolonging life has been dramatically enhanced. While this is generally 
considered a blessing, it may also add to already existing problems. 
Human beings have always had to face decisions about preserving or 
prolonging their lives . This is not new. What is new is the relative 
frequency with which such decisions must be faced today . .. at both ends 
of life. But there is another dimension to the problem which is new today. 
It is the introduction of a quality-of-life consideration into the discussion . 
. The question is: What effect does the quality of a patient's life have on his 
duty to preserve it? Can it be so low that it affects the obligation to preserve 
this life ... even to the point of removing all obligation? 
In the past , moral theologians have always admitted that the obligation 
to preserve or prolong life was not an absolute one; it had its limits. They 
discussed this duty and its limits in terms of a distincti~n between ordinary 
and extraordinary means. The obligation to prolong life would not go 
beyond the use of ordinary means. Generally speaking, these were means 
which would not be too burdensome and which would actually prolong life 
in a significant way. If means were excessively burdensome, or if they 
would not prolong life in any appreciable way, one could not impose an 
obligation on a person to use them. 
As already pointed out , this decision must be faced with greater 
frequency today than in the past, since there are ways and means of 
preserving life today that were simply not available in the past. While some 
of these treatments would be classified as extraordinary, because they are 
very burdensome or offer no hope of benefit , some would be considered 
ordinary (at least for short term use) , and therefore obligatory. It is the 
increased availability of these means that has raised the quality-of-life 
issue. Many patie'nts who simply would have died in the past may now 
continue to liv\:!, The question is: Must they? Or may they forego treatment 
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available today, even though it is not excessively burdensome and will 
prolong life, because of their quality-of-life? Obviously, they cannot 
retreat into the past and pretend such means do not exist. But may they 
appeal simply to quality-of-life considerations in assessing their duty to 
preserve their lives? 
Among Catholic moral theologians in this country, this question was 
raised initially by Richard McCormick, S.l. , regarding infants born with 
serious defects. I The question was , at least in part, occasioned by an 
account in the New England Journal of Medicine of 43 seriously defective 
infants for whom treatment was rejected because of a poor prognosis for 
meaning(ullife. 2 McCormick accepted the basic quality-of-life approach 
but was attempting to produce more precise, and hence more secure, 
guidelines for making such decisions . He arrived at the following norm: if 
the defects were so severe that the child would never have the capacity for 
establishing human relations (a specifically human function), or would at 
least find it morally impossible to do so , the child would not be obliged 
even to the use of ordinary means . McCormick was speaking of infants , 
but the norm would obviously have to apply even to those who had 
reached the age when the capacity for establishing human relations should 
have been reached. Logic would demand that such incapacity even at this 
stage would remove any obligation to preserve life. 
But the allowance would not apply to children with lesser defects. The 
obligation to use ordinary means could prevail in such cases. Thus it might 
prevail in the case of the ordinary retarded child, or the child with lesser 
physical defects . 
McCormick Used Pius XII's Argument 
In support of his position, McCormick used the argument Pius XII 
made to justify omission of extraordinary means , namely that an 
obligation to use extraordinary means "would be too bu densome for 
most men and would render the attainment of the higher, more important 
good too difficult."3 The Pontiff was explaining why one could not oblige a 
person to use extraordinary means, but McCormick took it to mean that if 
the patient himself or herself would not have either the physical or even 
moral capacity to achieve what he considered to be the higher good 
(establish human relations) to which the Pontiff was referring, there would 
be no obligation to preserve his life. In so doing he was adding a quality of 
life norm to the traditional quality of treatment norm already in place. 
This went radically beyond anything the Pontiff had in mind. 
The practicality of McCormick's norm has been questioned , since in 
many cases it would be most difficult to make a very precise judgment at 
time of birth about the eventual capability - or lack of it - of a seriously 
defective infant for human function. This would be even more true of a 
prediction of moral incapacity. In the latter case, the physical potency 
would be present but the handicapped person would be so distracted by his 
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handicap that it would be extremely difficult to relate to others in a human 
way. Indeed it would be difficult to make such a judgment of a person at 
the appropriate age . The added problem of prediction doubles the 
difficulty. Our primary concern here is with the acceptability of the norm, 
rather than its practicality. Even if it was a very practical norm, we hope to 
show that there are serious reasons to question its acceptability. 
More recently, in an article in the N EJ M , a quality-of-life norm was 
applied to a third trimester termination of pregnancy.4 The assumption in 
a third trimester pregnancy is that the fetus is viable, and that therefore, 
termination of the pregnancy is not automatically a lethal procedure. In a 
particular case, however, a doctor may judge that termination of a third 
trimester pregnancy would be lethal. In that case we are presuming that the 
authors would not allow termination. We are not discussing the allowance 
of a lethal procedure on the basis of quality-of-life considerations. We are 
dealing only with the duty to preserve life. 
In the past, termination of pregnancy right after viability was allowed 
only if the life of the mother (or the fetus) was at stake. It was not allowed 
on the basis of the quality-of-life of the fetus. One ofthe theses ofthe above 
article is that it would be permissible to terminate a third trimester 
pregnancy if there is total or virtual absence of cognitive function in the 
fetus. The authors felt that this condition was verified in the case of a fetus 
diagnosed as anencephalic. The article speaks of the benefits that might 
come to the mother from such a termination, but these do not seem to be 
the primary consideration. It seems clear that the basic justification for 
terminating the pregnancy and the risk to the fetus involved is the quality-
of-life judgment made about the fetus . 
While the wording of the condition these authors use is different , the 
meaning of the requirement would seem to be close to McCormick's lack 
of capacity for human relations . His allowance even for the lack of moral 
potency may go beyond what is allowed in this case, since it would include 
even a person who was conscious, but so obsessed by some handicap that it 
would be very difficult to establish human relations. It should be pointed 
out, however, that the authors of the article allow termination of 
pregnancy where there is "virtual" absence of cognitive function . This may 
approximate the moral impotency of the McCormick norm, but since the 
authors do not elucidate the meaning of virtual , we are not sure whether it 
does. 
In practice, McCormick's norm might, in some sense, be less difficult to 
apply, since the ability to establish human relations would seem to call for 
some ability to communicate externally. One who could not do so would 
not be able to establish such relations. But cognition can be present 
without communication. So one cannot conclude with certainty to the 
absence of cognition from the fact that a person cannot communicate (e.g. , 
a person in a coma). Admission of this would seem to be implied in 
extending the allowance of termination of pregnancy even to the case 
where there is "virtual" absence of cognition. 
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In recent times also, the same question has been raised regarding 
patients in an irreversible coma (or a persistent vegetative state). If, indeed, 
the case is terminal (the patient will die shortly whether the treatment is 
used or not), since treatment will be useless, it cannot be obligatory. But in 
a case where treatment will prolong life and · will not be excessively 
burdensome, it will be obligatory according to traditional norms. Some 
want to argue that even in this case, if the treatment does nothing more 
than prolong comatose life , it may still be omitted. In other words, the 
quality-of-Iife of a person in an irreversible coma automatically releases 
him or her from any obligation to preserve it. So if a treatment, even the 
most ordinary kind , will do nothing more than prolong life , they will argue 
that there is no obligation to use it. Briefly, there is no obligation to 
preserve this kind of life in itself. 
Norm Applied in California Court 
This norm was applied practically in a California court hearing to the 
case of Clarence Herbert, a 54-year-old man declared to be in an 
irreversible coma as the result of cardiac arrest. John J. Paris, S.J. , an 
expert witness in the case, argued that there was no obligation to keep this 
person alive because he was in an irreversible coma.S We cannot go into 
this case, but the appeals judge ruled in favor of a previous decision to stop 
treatment of Herbert on this score. We are not interested in the legal 
ramifications of the case, but the judge cited as the source of his decision 
the position taken by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in a 
publication entitled Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment. The 
judge's statement read as follows: 
. . proportionate treatment is that which , in the view of the patient , has at least a 
reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient , which benefits outweigh 
the burdens attendant to the treatment. Thus, even if a course of treatment might 
be extremely painful , it would still be proportionate treatment if'the prognosis 
was for complete cure or significant improvement in the patient's condition. On 
the other hand, a treatment course which is only minimally painful or intrusive 
may nonetheless be considered disproportionate to the potential benefits if the 
prognosis is virtually hopeless for any significant improvement in condition 6 
The judge traces this opinion to pp. 82-90 of the Commission's report. It 
is obviously a summary statement, so it will not be found verbatim in this 
report. The following sentence from that section comes closest to the 
judgment of the court: 
So long as a mere biological existence is not considered the only value, patients 
may want to take the nature of that additional life into account (p. 88). 
I am not sure that I could successfully interpret this sentence, but the judge 
seemed to feel that he was interpreting the mind of the Commission. 
February, 1986 29 
Briefly, according to the judge, the opinion of the Commission seemed to 
be that life as such (what the report calls "biological existence") is not a 
sufficient value to warrant the imposition of any duty to preserve it. In the 
present case, this means that since there is no chance to return the patient 
to a cognitive state , there is no obligation to keep him alive . Since this is an 
ethical commission, and the language used is basically ethical, one must 
conclude that it was not dealing on the level of legislation alone. 
The judge puts the obligation in terms of proportionate / dispropor-
tionate treatment. In the Declaration on Euthanasia, the Sacred 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (1980) says that some use this 
distinction in preference to the traditional ordinary/ extraordinary 
distinction to avoid the confusion caused by the latter. 7 The Congregation 
has nothing against the change in terminology, but insists that the 
underlying principle still holds good. In other words the criterion is still the 
benefit or burden of the treatment. 
What is ethically objectionable in the court decision is that it departs 
from this principle in two critical respects: (I) it seems to make benefit the 
sole consideration, and (2) it makes it depend on quality-of-life 
considerations. If a treatment will be effective, the court considers it 
obligatory even if "extremely painful." But more relevant to our discussion 
is the judgment that prolonging the life of a person in an irreversible coma 
is not considered enough of a benefit to make any treatment (even 
minimally painful or intrusive) obligatory. In other words, the quality-of-
life of this person is so low that there is no obligation to preserve it. As far 
as any obligation to preserve life goes , such a patient is like a dead man . In 
taking this stand the Court was departing not only from the distinction 
between ordinary / extraordinary means , but also from the principle 
underlying it. In making this point, however, we are not making a 
judgment about the rightness or wrongness of withdrawing treatment in 
the case involved . We have dealt with this issue elsewhere. 8 Here we are 
simply questioning the reason the Court gave to justjfy withdrawal. Our 
concern is that it approved withdrawal oftreatment for the wrong reason. 
In all of the cases described above the basic consideration in discerning 
the duty to prolong life was the quality-of-life the patient was leading. The 
argument is that life itself can be so burdensome or so empty that it ceases 
to be of value, or at least that its value is not sufficient to impose an 
obligation on the victim to preserve it. 
From what we have seen, it seems clear that in the past , the duty to 
preserve life was related to respect for life itself as a basic good . All life 
deserved this respect, and it was to be shown as long as life was present. No 
limitation was put on the duty in this regard. No one ever suggested that 
the duty pertained only to those who enjoyed a certain quality-of-life or 
that it did not pertain to those who did not have that quality. The duty was 
the same for all. 
At times the position of those who oppose quality-of-life considerations 
is classified pejoratively as "vitalism" or "biologism." I think this charge 
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may well apply to those who make life a supreme value to which everything 
else must yield and who hold , consequently, that all possible means to 
preserve it must be used . But to use the term of the position of those who 
oppose quality-of-life considerations is to misuse it. Those who hold this 
latter position in no way subscribe to the opinion that all means must be 
used to preserve life. They admit that there is a limit to the obligation to 
preserve life . They simply deny that this limit is based on quality-of-life as 
such. 
In two (termination of pregnancy, irreversible coma) of the three 
instances mentioned in which quality-of-life was appealed to, little 
argumentation was offered to substantiate the positions taken. As we have 
seen, McCormick, in the case of the seriously defective infant, constructed 
an argument from the reason given by Pius XII to show why one could not 
impose an obligation to use extraordinary means, but he changed the 
whole context of that argument, and in doing so , undermined any claim he 
might make to support from the Pontiffs statement. So what we have are 
three instances in which quality-of-life was appealed to with little or no 
supporting reason. 
McCormick attempts to show that his position is in continuity with past 
tradition by offering examples of cases in which quality-of-life was a 
consideration even in the past. It is quite true that, in the past, if quality-of-
life affected the means or treatment, it became a factor in assessing the duty 
to use the means. Thus , the quality-of-life resulting from a quadruple 
amputation would affect the duty to undergo this kind of surgery. 
Similarly, if the patient was dying, it would frequently render the means to 
preserve life useless. McCormick would argue that he is simply extending 
the use of quality-of-life to another situation. 
Writer Explains Contention 
It is the contention of this writer that moving the criterion from quality 
of treatment to quality of life as such is not just another s'tep in the same 
direction. It is a quantum leap. As pointed out, in the past, quality-of-life 
was considered only in reference to means. It might make a means 
burdensome, or it might make it useless. In the present usage it becomes 
the basic consideration. Even if it does not make the means burdensome or 
useless, it is appealed to in order to justify what is done or not done. This 
involves a whole new attitude toward this issue, and one which raises 
serious questions. 
This can be illustrated very simply with the Quinlan case. The intention 
in that case was to relieve the girl of the burden of long-term dependence 
on a respirator. It was not to bring on the death of the girl. This was made 
clear by the efforts (successful) to wean her from the respirator. And the 
goal (removing the burden constituted by the respirator) was achieved 
even though she lived. 
When quality-of-life is in itself the basic consideration, the entire 
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approach is different . The intention is not to free the patient of the burden 
of using some means, but the burden (or the uselessness) of the life itself. 
The only way to achieve this goal is by the death of the patient. So when 
one foregoes means because of quality-of-Iife considerations in this sense , 
the intention is the death of the patient. In this respect it differs vastly from 
the traditional approach. In the traditional approach, death was an 
unintentional side-effect offoregoing the treatment. In the current use , it is 
the intention in foregoing the treatment. Put briefly, in the traditional 
approach, one was making a legitimate application of the principle of 
double effect. In the present approach, one of the conditions for the 
legitimate use of that principle is violated (the evil effect is intended), so no 
such justification is available. 
On the contrary, given the intention of bringing on death , one is forced 
to the conclusion that an independent quality-of-life norm involves 
euthanasia by omission (or by act, in the case of the pregnancy 
termination). The recent Declaration on Euthanasia by the SCDF (1980) 
defines euthanasia as an act or omission which either by nature or 
intention brings on the death of the patient (out of mercy) . Since death is 
intended in quality-of-life decisions of this kind, they fulfill the definition 
of intentional euthanasia by act or omission. 
An additional problem in the use of quality-of-Iife norms is that, up to 
the present, no norm has been suggested that would clearly define the cases 
to which it would apply and exclude those to which it would not apply. In 
the present discussion we have seen it applied e.g., to a person in an 
irreversible coma, or in a persistent vegetative state, but there is no way to 
limit it to those cases. Tomorrow, it could be applied to someone with 
Alzheimer's disease, the next day to a person with some other serious 
mental or physical handicap. In other words, it puts us on a slippery slope 
with no braking power. This kind of norm, even if it were legitimate , would 
end up a menace to society because of its lack of precision. 
There are those who fear that if the withdrawal ~f treatment is not 
allowed on the basis of a quality-of-life criterion, we will be overwhelmed 
with people living in institutions at a very low level of existence. Even if this 
were the case, it would not of itself justify withdrawing treatment on a 
quality-of-Iife basis, any more than it would justify simply inflicting a 
painless death on them. However beneficial this might be to society, it 
would not be permissible. But I do not think this would happen. My 
judgment is that many, if not most, of the decisions that are made to 
withdraw treatment could be justified because burdensome means are 
involved. Many of the means in question, even if ordinary in a crisis 
situation, can become burdensome when used on a long term basis. If a 
judgment can be made that long term use will be required, such treatment 
may become optional. Certainly, death is the result in any event. But it is 
important that it should not result from the use of a criterion as 
objectionable and as open to abuse as quality-of-life. 
In brief, then, an independent quality-of-life norm represents a radical 
32 Linacre Quarterly 
departure from the past which put the emphasis on the quality of the 
treatment. The basic difference is in the intention. In the traditional quality 
of treatment norm, death is not intended but a side effect of a decision to 
spare the patient the burden of a difficult treatment. In an independent 
quality-of-life norm, death is intended , and this is basically what makes it 
objectionable. It is intentional euthanasia by omission (or by act in the 
termination of a third trimester pregnancy). But even if a quality-of-life 
approach could be justified in itself, the norms suggested up to the present 
carry with them inherent risk of abuse because of their imprecision. 
Adoption will put one on a slippery slope with no braking power. 
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